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THE ALASKA AIRLINES FLIGHT 261 ACCIDENT:





École des Mines de Paris - Pôle Cindynique
Sophia-Antipolis, France
On January 31, 2000, Alaska Airlines flight 261, an MD-83, crashed into the Pacific Ocean; after airplane pitch
control was lost as a result of the in-flight failure of the horizontal stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly's acme
nut threads (NTSB, 2003). Accident investigation revealed a wide range of human, technical, and organizational
factors contributing to this tragic event, providing a case where popular linear models and methods have difficulty
addressing the full complexity of the processes leading up to the accident. This paper treats each of the steps of
analysis according to the Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM; Hollnagel, 2004), a systemic non-linear
modeling method, and discusses how functional resonance occurred through the variability in functions performed
by joint human, technical, and organizational systems. It thereby aims to facilitate a better understanding of how
functional variability in design, certification, limited and inadequate maintenance, negligent safety culture,
economic factors, and human performance together can resonate and contribute to accidents. In this way it aims to
contribute to accident prevention and the engineering of more resilient complex dynamic systems.
Introduction
On the 31st of January, 2000, Alaska Airlines flight
261, an MD-83, crashed into the Pacific killing all 88
persons on board. Accident investigation (NTSB,
2003) revealed a wide range of human, technical, and
organizational factors contributing to this tragic event.
Analyzing and attempting to understand accidents is
an essential part of the safety management and
accident prevention process. Accident models play an
important role in this process, since they (implicitly
or explicitly) affect what investigators look for,
which contributing factors are found, and which
recommendations are issued. In other words, the
quality of the accident model used determines to a
large extent how good we will be at preventing the
next accident. As scholars have recently argued,
event-chain models of accident causation, and the
view on safety as a hunt for human error, do not
suffice  to  be  able  to  model  and  understand  the
complex nature of contemporary accidents, and more
‘systemic’ models of accidents and safety are
necessary (Amalberti, 2001; Dekker, 2004;
Hollnagel, 2004; Leveson, 2004; Rochlin, 1999;
Woods & Cook, 2002). Systemic models treat safety
as  an  emergent  property  of  systems as  a  whole,  and
try to find systemic vulnerabilities rather than flawed
components of a system.
One specific systemic accident model is the
Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM;
Hollnagel, 2004). FRAM decomposes socio-technical
systems by the functions they perform rather than by
their structure, and aims to capture the dynamics of
such systems by modeling non-linear dependencies
and variability with which functions are performed.
FRAM postulates that both normal performance
(success) and failure are emergent phenomena that
cannot be attriuted to specific system components.
Performance variability is natural in socio-technical
systems, enabling people to cope with complexity
and uncertainty. Thus, every function has a normal
weak variability. In FRAM, functional resonance is
the detectable signal (an undesirable event) that
emerges from the unintended interaction of the weak
variability of many signals.
Purpose
After describing the accident in more detail, FRAM
is presented and used in an attempt to understand and
model aspects of the Alaska Airlines Flight 261
accident.  FRAM is  applied  in  this  paper  to  the  facts
and findings that the NTSB (2003) reported after
their investigation and analysis. This paper thereby
serves the following purposes: (1) to describe, model
and thereby understand why the factors contributing
to the accident as identified by the NTSB could
manifest themselves as they did, (2) to assess the
usefulness of the Functional Resonance Accident
Model for accident analysis and thereby to sketch
how it may be used for accident prevention.
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Alaska Airlines Flight 261
The  stabilizer  of  the  MD-80  series  consists  of  a
horizontal pivoting wing mounted on top of the
vertical tail fin of the aircraft. The horizontal
stabilizer directs the pitch (nose-up/-down) of the
aircraft. The horizontal wing rotates around the
horizontal stabilizer aft hinge point at the back of the
horizontal stabilizer, so that if the front of the
horizontal stabilizer is down, it presses the tail down,
and thereby the nose of the airplane up. The back
edge of the horizontal stabilizer is the elevator, which
the (auto-) pilot uses to control the aircraft pitch. The
whole horizontal stabilizer can be trimmed to set the
wings to a ‘default’ air flow so that the nose pitch can
be adjusted to the centre of gravity of the aircraft.
The horizontal stabilizer and its trim tabs can be
controlled by the autopilot, and by the pilot with the
flight controls and switches in the cockpit. This helps
the pilots because it makes the controls lighter to
handle,  and  by  adjusting  the  trim  the  pilots  do  not
need  to  pull  or  push  the  control  column  to
compensate for a centre of gravity that has moved to
the front or to the back because of the aircraft’s
changing load.
A  jackscrew  assembly  at  the  front  of  the  horizontal
stabilizer moves the front of the horizontal wing up
and down. Inside the front of the vertical stabilizer
attached to the horizontal stabilizer front spar attach
bracket there are two motors (primary and alternate)
rotating an acme screw. This screw rotates in an
acme nut that is attached to the vertical stabilizer,
thus moving the horizontal stabilizer up and down.
The screw and the nut both have two threads each.
There are both electrical and mechanical stops (the
latter at more outward positions than the former) to
prevent the screw from rotating beyond a certain
point. Beyond a certain horizontal stabilizer position,
the elevators cannot compensate for the upward or
downward pressure of the stabilizer. There are
maximum downward and maximum upward
positions for the horizontal stabilizer, ensuring that
the (auto-) pilot can still control the pitch of the
aircraft with the elevators. Furthermore, the threads
on screw and nut need to be lubricated to avoid
excessive wear. This wear is checked during so-
called end-play checks, where an inspector and a
mechanic check the possibility for movement
between screw thread and nut thread, which is a
direct measurement for wear.
The executive summary of the National
Transportation Safety Board's accident report gives
an outline of the probable causes of the accident in
the eyes of the NTSB:
“The National Transportation Safety Board
determines that the probable cause of this accident
was a loss of airplane pitch control resulting from the
in-flight failure of the horizontal stabilizer trim
system jackscrew assembly's acme nut threads. The
thread failure was caused by excessive wear resulting
from Alaska Airlines' insufficient lubrication of the
jackscrew assembly. Contributing to the accident
were Alaska Airlines' extended lubrication interval
and the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA)
approval of that extension, which increased the
likelihood that a missed or inadequate lubrication
would result in excessive wear of the acme nut
threads, and Alaska Airlines' extended end play
check interval and the FAA's approval of that
extension, which allowed the excessive wear of the
acme nut threads to progress to failure without the
opportunity for detection. Also contributing to the
accident was the absence on the McDonnell Douglas
MD-80  of  a  fail-safe  mechanism  to  prevent  the
catastrophic effects of total acme nut thread loss.”
(NTSB, 2003, p. xii)
The Functional Resonance Accident Model
The functional resonance model (Hollnagel, 2004)
describes system failure as a resonance of the normal
variability of functions. To arrive at a description of
functional variability and resonance, and to determine
recommendations for damping unwanted variability,
a FRAM analysis consists of four steps:
Step 1
Identifying essential system functions, and
characterizing each function by six basic parameters.
Functions are described through six aspects, in terms
of  their  input  (I,  that  which  the  function  uses  or
transforms), output (O, that which the function
produces), preconditions (P, conditions that must be
fulfilled to perform a function), resources (R, that
which the function needs or consumes), time (T, that
which affects time availability), and control (C, that
which supervises or adjusts the function), and may be
described in a table and subsequently visualized in a
hexagonal representation (FRAM module, Figure 1).
Step 2
Characterizing the (context dependent) potential
variability through common performance conditions.
Eleven common performance conditions (CPCs) are
identified in the FRAM method to be used to elicit
the potential variability: 1) availability of personnel
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and equipment, 2) training, preparation, competence,
3) communication quality, 4) human-machine
interaction, operational support, 5) availability of
procedures, 6) work conditions, 7) goals, number and
conflicts, 8) available time, 9) circadian rhythm,
stress, 10) team collaboration, and 11) organizational
quality. These CPCs address the combined human,
technological, and organizational aspects of each
function. After identifying the CPCs, the variability
needs to be determined in a qualitative way in terms
of stability, predictability, sufficiency, and
boundaries of performance.
Figure 1. A FRAM module
Step 3
Defining the functional resonance based on possible
dependencies/couplings among functions and the
potential for functional variability.
The output of the functional description of step 1 is a
list of functions each with their six aspects. These
functions may be linked together through their aspects.
For example, the output of one function may be an
input to another function, or produce a resource, fulfill
a pre-condition, or enforce a control or time constraint.
When the links between functions are found, through
thorough analysis of functions and common or related
aspects, these links may be combined with the results
of step 2, the characterization of variability. That is,
the links specify where the variability of one function
may have an impact, or may propagate. This analysis
thus determines how a (stochastic) resonance can
occur of variability across functions in the system. For
example, if the output of a function is unpredictably
variable, another function that requires this output as a
resource may be performed unpredictably as a
consequence. Many such occurrences and
propagations of variability may have the effect of
resonance; the added variability under the normal
detection threshold becomes a 'signal', a high risk or
vulnerability.
Step 4
Identifying barriers for variability (damping factors)
and specifying required performance monitoring.
Barriers are hindrances that may either prevent an
unwanted event to take place, or protect against the
consequences of an unwanted event (Hollnagel, 2004).
Barriers can be described in terms of barrier systems
(the organizational and/or physical structure of the
barrier) and barrier functions (the manner by which the
barrier achieves its purpose). In FRAM, four
categories of barrier systems are identified (each  with
their potential barrier functions, see Hollnagel, 2004):
(1) Physical barrier systems block the movement
or transportation of mass, energy, or information.
Examples include fuel tanks, safety belts, and filters.
2) Functional barrier systems set up pre-
conditions  that  need  to  be  met  before  an  action  (by
human and/or machine) can be undertaken. Examples
include locks, passwords, and sprinklers.
(3) Symbolic barrier systems are indications of
constraints on action that are physically present.
Examples include signs, checklists, alarms, and
clearances. Potential functions encompass
preventing, regulating, and authorizing actions.
(4) Incorporeal barrier systems are indications of
constraints on action that are not physically present.
Examples include ethical norms, group pressure,
rules, and laws.
Regarding the impairment of barriers, Hollnagel
(2004) defines ten system and human failure modes:
timing, duration, distance/length, speed, direction,
force/power/pressure, magnitude, object, sequence,
and quantity and volume.
Besides recommendations for barriers, FRAM is
aimed at specifying recommendations for the
monitoring of performance and variability, to be able
to detect undesired variability. Performance
indicators may thus be developed for every function
and every link between functions.
FRAM Applied to Alaska 261
The first step involves identifying essential system
functions, and characterizing each function by six
basic parameters. By going through the events and
activities through time and throughout the socio-
technical system, as reported in the accident report
(NTSB, 2003), functions may be identified to form a
description of the essential system functions. Functions
are described through their aspects, which have also be
extracted from the accident report or other sources of
information. In the Alaska 261 case the report contains
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considerably detailed information so that a functional
account of the performance of the socio-technical
system may be established. Table 1 presents an
example, the function of 'end-play checking'.
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Table 1. A FRAM module function description.
Many  such  functions  may  be  described,  as  will  be
illustrated further on. Note that there is no single
right level of analysis, but the analysis continues until
the analyst decides the granularity of the analysis to
be fine enough to account for the variability in
system behavior that needs to be explained.
In step two (context dependent) potential variability is
characterized through common performance conditions
(CPCs). In the case of a prospective (risk) analysis of a
system this would mean the characterization of
variability ranging from normal situations to worst case
scenarios. In this case of retrospective analysis of an
accident report, the specific scenario and data for which
to determine the potential variability are given. Table 2














Work conditions Lax safety culture Incompatible
#Goals & conflicts Efficient &
thorough
> Capacity
Available time Time pressure Inadequate
Circadian rhythm Adjusted
Team collaboration Overruling checks Inefficient
Organization quality Bureaucracy, no
feedback
Ineffective
Table 2. End-play checking CPCs.
In case of the end-play checking function, the accident
report states that there was a high pressure on
maintenance personnel at Alaska Airlines, affecting
the availability of personnel and time. Furthermore,
there were unclear indications of how serious an end-
play exactly at the regulatory allowable limit would be,
even at the before-last check where this was the case.
Also, the equipment with which this was done was
difficult to use, and the procedures unclear. The
measurement was subsequently verified and the
measurement decision overruled by a maintenance
team member, who measured a lower end-play and
chose this safer result to be final. In general, the
reported interviews with personnel indicate occurrence
of efficiency-thoroughness trade-offs (Hollnagel,
2004) with statements like ‘it's not really important’,
‘this is normally OK’, and ‘it will be checked by
someone else later’, indicating a rather lax safety
culture. As a last example, many steps through the
managerial levels at Alaska Airlines, review boards,
and the FAA were necessary in order to change the
end-play check intervals, steps that after the fact
proved to be ineffective.
The third step defines the functional resonance based
on possible dependencies/couplings among functions
and the potential for functional variability. We will
illustrate this process by taking up a few examples of
contributing factors as identified by the accident
report (NTSB, 2003).
As an example we may sketch how the two
maintenance functions of 'lubrication' and 'end-play
checking' are linked to the function 'maintenance
oversight', as sketched in Figure 2. The regulator, the
FAA,  performs  oversight  of  the  maintenance  at
airlines. This can be described as a function, which is
also constrained in available time for instance. The
function 'lubrication' may be defined similarly to
'end-play checking', these functions have similar
aspects. Then the output of the 'maintenance
oversight' function is the control on the two
maintenance functions. This means that the
variability that occurs in maintenance oversight
makes that the control of the maintenance functions
vary. If the controls of these functions have high
variability, the performance of these functions will
also have variability.
This then again resonates with variability in other
functions in the system. As is sketched in Figure 3, a
variability in the output of 'end-play checking' and
'lubrication' links to a variability in the functioning of
the jackscrew system, and therefore in the control of
the horizontal stabilizer, and aircraft pitch control.
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Figure 2. The functions 'end-play checking', 'lubrication', and 'maintenance oversight' and links between them, with
specifications and indications (red/dark) of undesired variability
Figure 3. Functions in normal situations, and links between functions. Aspects with undesired variability
contributing to the accident are indicated in red (dark), lacking links and functions by dashed lines
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Thus we can see that the variability that is identified by
CPCs in various functions may have consequences for
other functions, a process which is traceable through
matching function aspects. In this sense, the variability
of several functions may resonate in that the variability
adds up to an overall system performance that is
beyond the envelope of safe functioning. A 'signal' in
the form of an accident may emerge.
Many more examples from this intriguing accident
could be presented in terms of function descriptions,
variability analyses, links between functions, and
emergence of resonance, if paper size constraints
would allow. For more details about the accident
please refer to the NTSB (2003) report or Dekker's
(2004) analysis.
The fourth step includes (1) identifying barriers for
variability that are designed to dampen undesired
variability, and (2) specifying required performance
monitoring to allow for necessary variability while
being able to detect when this variability is undesired.
Here, divergence between the system as it was
designed and envisioned, as it functions in practice,
and as it with hindsight ought to have functioned and
been designed, may be found. In order to dampen the
variability in control of both maintenance functions
in Figure 2 for example, the regulating symbolic
barrier of the procedure may be strengthened (the
procedure made more clear) so that the barrier system
(procedure) will have its desired effect and the end-
play checking function is performed with less
variability. The function 'limiting stabilizer
movement' (Figure 3) is an example of a design flaw.
A restraining physical barrier on horizontal stabilizer
movement may have provided the failsafe
mechanism that was judged not to be in place in the
design of the MD-80 (or its predecessor, the DC-9,
originally). To summarize, the FRAM barrier
vocabulary enables the specification of damping
factors where undesirable variability is expected or
detected. The second effort in safety management is
therefore the monitoring of variability and the
examination of when this variability is undesired.
This constitutes the second part of step four, specifying
performance indicators to enable monitoring of
variability. As an example, the 'maintenance oversight'
function can be modeled to be linked to the 'DC-9
design' function of the aircraft. One output of the
design function is the design knowledge and rationale
behind the chosen solutions, which in retrospect
should have been a resource in the 'maintenance
oversight' function. At the time of the accident, and
after a series of apparently locally rational increments,
the maintenance intervals of lubrication and end-play
checking were several times larger than the intervals
prescribed in the sixties for the DC-9. The question is
how to be able to foresee which variability may safely
occur in order to cope with a competitive transport
market, and which variability to dampen. Performance
indicators based on an extensive analysis of sources of
variability and links between functions may aid in
making these decisions.
Conclusion
This paper describes and applies the Functional
Resonance Accident Model to a retrospective
analysis of failure of a complex socio-technical
system, in order to highlight the dynamics of these
systems with regard to non-linear interdependencies
and variability in function performance, and to sketch
FRAM's unique systemic perspective of functional
resonance. The paper argues that FRAM is able to
capture the dynamics and non-linearities that non-
systemic models have difficulty explaining. Future
empirical studies of prospective analyses are
suggested to test the model and accompanying
method to be able to evaluate FRAM's full potential.
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